On March 25, 2024, the California Supreme Court issued its opinion in Huerta v. CSI Electrical Contractors, S275431. The Huerta case involved an action by an employee of a subcontractor hired by Defendant CSI Electrical Contractors, to provide procurement, installation, construction, testing, and services at the California Flats Solar Project in San Luis Obispo and Monterey Counties. A designated road provided access from a guard shack located at the perimeter of the project site to a security gate several miles away. The security gate was designated by Huerta’s employer as the “first place” he had to be at the beginning of the workday. At the security gate, Huerta was required to undergo a security check, which consisted of scanning his security badge and a visual inspection of his vehicle. It then took Huerta another 10 to 15 minutes to drive from the security gate to the employee parking lot, where Huerta parked his vehicle before beginning his work.
Huerta filed a wage and hour class action in the Monterey County Superior Court (state court), which was removed to the Northern District of California (federal court). In the class action, Huerta alleged he was not being paid for the time spent waiting at the security gate to have his security badge scanned and his vehicle inspected. He further alleged he was not being compensated for the 10 to 15 minutes it took him to drive from the security gate to the employee parking lot. Finally, Huerta alleged that under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement governing the terms and conditions of his employment, his standard workday included an unpaid 30 minute meal period but that he was prevented from leaving the project site during that meal period. The federal district court certified the class. CSI moved for summary judgment on the class wage claims, which the district court granted. Huerta appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit used a procedure by which it is permitted to certify questions of California state law to the California Supreme Court for resolution. The Ninth Circuit certified the following questions to the California Supreme Court:
- Is time spent on an employer’s premises in a personal vehicle and waiting to scan an identification badge, have security guards peer into the vehicle, and then exit a security gate compensable as hours worked within the meaning of Wage Order No. 16? (As an on-site employee working on the solar project, Huerta was covered by Wage Order No. 16: Certain On-Site Occupations in the Construction, Drilling, Logging, and Mining Industries.)
- Is time spent on the employer’s premises in a personal vehicle, driving between the security gate and the employee parking lots, while subject to certain rules from the employer, compensable as hours worked or as employer mandated travel within the meaning of Wage Order No. 16?
- Is time spent on the employer’s premises, when workers are prohibited from leaving but not required to engage in employer-mandated activities, compensable as hours worked within the meaning of Wage Order No. 16 or under California Labor Code section 1194, when that time was designated as an unpaid meal period under a qualifying collective bargaining agreement under California Labor Code 512?
With respect to the first question, the California Supreme Court held that an employee’s time spent on an employer’s premises awaiting and undergoing an employer-mandated exit procedure that includes the employer’s visual inspection of the employee’s personal vehicle is compensable as hours worked within the meaning of Wage Order No. 16.
With respect to the second question, the California Supreme Court held that the time an employee spends traveling between the security gate and the employee parking lot is compensable as employer-mandated travel under Wage Order No. 16 if the security gate was the first location where the employee’s presence was required for employment-related reasons other than the practical necessity of accessing the worksite. The Court did hold, however, that this time was not compensable as hours worked because an employer’s imposition of ordinary workplace rules during their drive to the worksite in a personal vehicle does not create the requisite level of employer control to convert that time to hour worked.
Finally, with respect to the third question, the California Supreme Court held that when an employee is covered by a qualifying collective bargaining agreement, which provides the employee with an unpaid meal period, that time is nonetheless compensable as hours worked within the meaning of Wage Order No. 16 if the employer prohibits the employee from leaving the employer’s premises or a designated area during the meal period and if this prohibition prevents the employee from engaging in otherwise feasible personal activities. The Court reasoned that even if the employees are covered by a qualifying collective bargaining agreement, the employees could not bargain away the right to receive minimum wages for “all hours worked” as established in California Labor Code Section 1194.
These holdings in Huerta build upon a now long line of cases at the California Supreme Court in which the Court has found that all time spent by employees under an employer’s control constitutes compensable hours worked. The Court continues to apply the concept of employer control expansively. For instance, in Mendiola v. CPS Security Solutions, Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 833, the California Supreme Court held that security guards who were required to remain onsite during a 24-hour shift were entitled to be compensated for all time on site, even time spent sleeping in an employer-provided trailer. In Frlekin v. Apple Inc. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1038, the California Supreme Court held that time spent by employees working in Apple stores waiting in security lines at the end of their shifts constituted compensable hours worked. Accordingly, while the Huerta decision was decided under Wage Order No. 16, it has broader implications for all employers in terms of the Court’s continuing expansion of the concept of employer control and its determination that time spent by employees under such ostensible control constitutes compensable hours worked.
Questions
If you have any questions regarding this Legal Alert, please contact the following attorney or any of Kronick’s Labor and Employment Practice Group lawyers.
David Tyra
dtyra@kmtg.com | 916.321.4594
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