In Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, [99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 316 (Cal. 2000)], the California Supreme Court held that, when a public employee pursues administrative remedies and receives an adverse finding, the failure to have the findings set aside through judicial review results in a binding decision on discrimination actions under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), but not in the action under Title VII.
The City of Loma Linda terminated the employment of Barry Johnson (hereafter “Johnson”). On that same day, he filed a grievance with the City. The City’s personnel board rejected Johnson’s grievance, finding that the City had terminated his employment for economic, not discriminatory, reasons. Johnson then filed a discrimination claim with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing and received a “right to sue” letter. He then filed in a complaint in superior court. He alleged FEHA and federal Title VII discrimination claims. He also sought a writ of administrative mandate challenging the actions of the personnel board and city council. The superior court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment and Johnson appealed.
The first issue the California Supreme Court addressed was whether the doctrine of laches barred Johnson’s petition for a writ. If the doctrine of laches were to apply, it would operate to bar the claim. The doctrine only applies if two conditions are met: (1) an unreasonable delay in filing the action by the plaintiff and (2) the defendant is disadvantaged by the unreasonable delay.
The Supreme Court found that Johnson unreasonably delayed filing the petition for administrative mandate because he waited more than 18 months after the city council rejected his administrative appeal. Furthermore, after filing the petition, Johnson did not pursue his claim for another 18 months. The Supreme Court also found that the unreasonable delay disadvantaged the City because it had assigned Johnson’s duties to other employees and reinstating him would significantly alter its new management structure. The Court found that an award of back pay would require the City to make double payments – back wages to Johnson and salaries to the employees assigned his former duties. Therefore, the Supreme Court determined that the doctrine of laches barred Johnson’s petition for a writ.
The Court also addressed the issue of how its finding affected Johnson’s claims of discrimination under FEHA and Title VII. The court noted its former decision in Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 465 (1976), where it held that if a party to a proceeding fails to challenge an agency’s adverse findings, the findings are binding in later civil actions. Based on this rule, the Supreme Court found that because Johnson’s administrative action was barred by the doctrine of laches, the City’s finding that he was discharged for economic reasons was binding on Johnson’s FEHA claim.
However, the Supreme Court found that Johnson’s Title VII claim was not barred because it was not a judgment on the merits. The Court held that a state court judgment only bars a Title VII claim if the judgment is final. In this case, the Court found that “the defense of laches has nothing to do with the merits of the cause against which it is asserted.” Thus, the Title VII claim was not barred.
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