In Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training v. The Superior Court of Sacramento County, (— Cal.Rptr.3d —, 2007 WL 2410091, Cal., Aug. 27, 2007), the California Supreme Court addressed whether the California Public Records Act (“CPRA”) requires the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (“Commission”) to disclose the names, employing departments, and the dates of hiring and termination of California peaces officers contained in its database. The Supreme Court concluded that the CPRA requires disclosure of such information but that the Commission may seek to establish that information regarding particular peace officers should be excised from the disclosure for safety reasons.
Facts
The Commission is a state agency that is charged with establishing standards for peace officers. California law enforcement agencies that participate in the Commission’s programs and receive funding from the Commission must permit the Commission to inspect its records to verify claims for reimbursement and to confirm compliance with regulations. Participating police departments must report to the Commission whenever a peace officer is newly appointed, receives a promotion, or is terminated. The form submitted to the Commission includes the officer’s name, date of birth, social security number, gender, address, race or ethnicity, and rank and department. The department must report on the form the officer’s appointment date, the type of appointment, time base, pay status, termination date, and reason for termination, if applicable. The Commission maintains a database of the reported information but does not release the information to the public.
A reporter from the Los Angeles Times (“Times”) made a request to the Commission for information about all new appointments from 1991 through 2001 including the names and birthdates of the officers, their employing agencies, the dates of appointment, termination dates, and reason for termination. The Commission denied the request. The Times filed a petition for a writ of mandate in superior court seeking release of the requested information under the CPRA. The superior court ordered the Commission to release each officer’s name, appointing agency, date of new appointment, and termination date. A Court of Appeal vacated the lower court’s judgment.
Decision
The Supreme Court held that the CPRA requires disclosure of the names, employing departments, and the dates of hiring and termination of the peace officers. Under the CPRA, the public is entitled to access “any writing containing information relating to the conduct of the public’s business owned, used or retained by any state or local agency” unless one of the exceptions stated in the act exempts disclosure. The CPRA exempts from disclosure those records “the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to federal or state law, including, but not limited to, the provisions of the Evidence Code relating to privilege.” Penal Code section 832.7 provides that “‘[p]eace officer . . . personnel records, . . . or information obtained from those records are confidential’ and may be disclosed in litigation only under specified procedures, which require a showing of good cause.”
The question before the Supreme Court was whether the records of names, employing departments, and dates of employment maintained by the Commission constitute “peace officer personnel records” within the meaning of section 832.7. The Court concluded that they did not. A personnel record is defined by Penal Code section 832.8 as “any file maintained under that individual’s name by his or her employing agency and containing records relating” to personal data, medical history, election of employee benefits, personnel decisions, complaints or investigations of complaints, and “other information the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy.” A peace officer’s name, employing agency, and employment dates are not specifically listed in section 832.8 as components of a personnel record. The Court concluded that “peace officer personnel records include only the types of information enumerated in section 832.8.” Information is not rendered confidential simply by placing it in a file that contains the information listed in section 832.8.
In adopting section 832.8, the Legislature was not concerned with rendering confidential an officer’s identity or the basic facts of his or her employment. The statute lists types of information that are not generally known to persons with whom an officer interacts. However an officer’s name and his employing agency are generally made available to the public, including persons that are arrested by an officer. Also, the names of all public employees are viewed as public information. “The public’s legitimate interest in the identity and activities of peace officers is even greater than its interest in those of the average public servant.” The public must be kept fully informed of the activities of peace officers. The Court concluded that, when the Legislature defined “personnel records” it “drew the line carefully, with due concern for the competing interests” of the public and the officers. The information sought by the Times was not sought in conjunction with the personal or sensitive information that section 832.8 seeks to protect. Therefore, the information sought by the Times is not personal data within the meaning of section 832.8.
The disclosure of the information also would not constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. The public has an interest in how local law enforcement agencies and the Commission conduct the public’s business. The Times sought the information to enable it to trace an officer’s movement from one agency to another to identify general trends and potentially inappropriate employment practices. The public has a legitimate interest in these matters. Furthermore, the fact of an employee’s public employment is not a personal matter.
The Court did recognize that the duties of a particular officer, such as an undercover officer, may require anonymity. The CPRA provides a catchall exception that applies if “on the facts of the particular case the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record.” If the disclosure of information would endanger a particular officer, the Commission may segregate the information on that officer from the records that it discloses. However, the Court held that “the privacy and safety interests of peace officers in general do not outweigh the public’s interest in the disclosure of the information sought by the Times.” The Court found that the information sought by the Times was not exempt under the CPRA. It remanded the matter, however, to allow the Commission to demonstrate that information concerning particular officers should be exempted because they work undercover or otherwise have an interest in maintaining anonymity.