In Ahmadi-Kashani v. The Regents of the University of California, (— Cal.Rptr.3d —, 2008 WL 217769, Cal.App. 4 Dist., Jan. 28, 2008), a California Court of Appeal considered whether an employee failed to exhaust her administrative remedies in a sexual harassment lawsuit by failing to complete the grievance process afforded to her. The court reversed the judgment finding that because the grievance process available to the employee did not include a “quasi-judicial” hearing, her failure to complete it did not preclude her from seeking remedies in court.
Facts
Masteneh Ahmadi-Kashani (“Ahmadi-Kashani”) worked as a research assistant in the cardiology department of the University of California, Irvine (“University”). In 2003, she complained that her supervisor was sexually harassing her. Shortly thereafter she was laid off. Ahmadi-Kashani filed a grievance completing two steps of the University’s grievance process: 1) delivering a written grievance to the labor relations office, and 2) attending a meeting with University officials.
After being told her grievance would be rejected, Ahmadi-Kashani did not proceed to Step 3 of the process which was filing an appeal with the labor relations office. Instead, she filed suit against the University alleging sexual harassment and wrongful termination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). The trial court granted summary judgment to the University finding that because Ahmadi-Kashani had not completed the grievance process, she had not exhausted her administrative remedies and therefore could not sue. Ahmadi-Kashani appealed.
Decision
The appellate court determined that because of the inadequacy of the University’s grievance process—it offered Ahmadi-Kashani no “quasi-judicial” hearing to establish her case, merely an informal meeting—she was not required to exhaust it before taking her FEHA case to court.
Further, the court explained, in Marcario v. County of Orange (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 397, it ruled that a grievance process under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement does not preclude action for violation of a statute unless the agreement explicitly states that it does, and provides a fair procedure for doing so. The “truncated process” in this case “cannot be viewed as sufficient to preclude a plaintiff’s right to vindicate her statutory rights in court,” the court ruled.
Therefore, Ahmadi-Kashan’s initiation and then abandonment of an internal grievance process did not preclude her lawsuit. Because it did not include a “quasi-judicial” hearing, she was free to walk away from it and pursue her FEHA claim in court. The trial court therefore erred in ruling to the contrary and the summary judgment for the University was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.