District Court Erred In Granting An Anti-SLAPP Motion To Strike Where Some Of County Supervisor’s Hostile Public Statements[br]Against A Company Were Actionable

In Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. v. County of San Diego, (— F.3d —, 2008 WL 600974, C.A.9 (Cal.), March 6, 2008), the United States Court of Appeals considered whether a district court erred in granting a motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP law in a lawsuit brought by a company that owns and manages several mobile home parks against a county and a county supervisor after the supervisor made hostile public statements against the company. The Court of Appeals held that the district court erred in granting the motion to strike because some of the county supervisor’s statements were actionable.

Facts

In July 2002, Manufactured Home Communities, Inc., (“MHC”) initiated phased rent increases in three of the mobile home parks that it owns and operates within San Diego County. MHC sent 90-day notices to the tenants as required by local law. Tenants of one of the parks contacted Dianne Jacob (“Jacob”), a county supervisor, about the rent increases.

On November 15, 2002, Jacob issued a news advisory that stated MHC was preying upon elderly tenants of the parks by raising their rents by 25%. The next day, Jacob attended a meeting at one of the parks and made statements which MHC alleges are false. Jacob stated the following: (1) “that MHC is a greedy, profit-driven company that enjoys forcing the elderly out of their homes in order to move in more expensive homes for greater profit;” (2) “that it would be interesting to see if” MHC had been engaging in any fraudulent actions; and (3) that the County Counsel and the District Attorney “were ‘very interested’ in following up on whether civil or criminal actions should be pursued against [MHC].” On November 18, 2002, Jacob sent a letter to MHC’s chairman, which stated that MHC had engaged in “rent gouging at its worst” and its actions represented “corporate greed,” some residents of the parks had been forced to surrender their homes because of the rent increases, and the rent increases were well above the “2003 Fair Market Rent of $539 for manufactured home spaces.”

On December 10, 2002, Jacob allegedly told “local media that MHC had lied to the Department of Environmental Health about [its] clean-up effort in response to a sewage spill” at one of its parks. Additionally, Jacob allegedly stated that MHC is a “bad company” and that she wanted MHC “out of town,” that MHC should not get away with its lies, and that she wanted “to make sure that they’re cited for every single offense . . . and whatever actions need to be taken are taken,” in either a criminal action or a civil action. The San Diego Union Tribune published an article on January 9, 2003, which contained a statement by Jacob that MHC was preying on older people who had limited means and that she was going to make “things even hotter for the predatory company.” On April 5, 2003, Jacob allegedly stated to tenants of the parks that MHC “made a practice of buying ‘distressed properties with the intent to run out older residents to bring in newer homes,'” and because there was no rent control ordinance “we need to take other measures . . . like litigation.” Jacob made similar statements about MHC on six other occasions in 2003.

MHC filed a lawsuit against County and Jacob in federal district court alleging both federal and state tort claims, including a cause of action for defamation. County and Jacob filed a motion to strike the state tort law claim under California anti-SLAPP law. The district court granted the motion to strike. MHC sought review by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Decision

The Court of Appeals held that the district court erred in granting the motion to strike.
The California anti-SLAPP (“Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation”) law was enacted in response to “a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech.” In order for a defendant to prevail on a motion to strike, he or she must make a prima facie showing that the lawsuit arises from the exercise of the First Amendment rights of free speech or petition. Once the prima facie showing has been made, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that he or she will likely prevail on the merits of his or her claim.

When determining the likelihood of success on the merits, a court must determine whether the statements that gave rise to the plaintiff’s complaint are actionable at all, and most importantly, whether the alleged defamatory statements actually “convey a false factual imputation.” If the statements are made in a setting where the parties are trying to persuade other people to take their side on a position, like in a public debate or a labor dispute, “language which generally might be considered as statements of fact may well assume the character of statements of opinion.” If a statement is “reasonably susceptible of an interpretation which implies a provably false assertion of fact,” then the issue may be submitted to a jury so that it can determine “whether such an interpretation was in fact conveyed.”

County and Jacob asserted that Jacob’s statements were merely ones of opinion and not “provably false assertions of fact,” and, therefore, were not actionable. MHC acknowledged that, although some statements were ones of opinion, a reasonable judge or jury could find that some of Jacob’s statements were actionable because there were “provably false assertions of facts.” One such statement was Jacob’s claim that MHC lied to the County about the sewage problem. Another was Jacob’s statement that MHC has a reputation of running older people out of their mobile home parks and increasing the value of the parks and then selling them for a profit. Another statement involved Jacob’s claim that the district attorney was following the matter to determine whether to pursue a civil or criminal action. The trial court agreed that a reasonable factfinder could interpret these statements as ones of fact, not opinion.

As to these statements, the Court of Appeal held that it could not, as a matter of law, declare “that no reasonable person could construe them as provably false.” The court reversed the district court’s judgment as to these statements and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The court left it to the jury to decide “whether Jacob’s statements were opinions based upon express facts.” It noted that “a reasonable juror could conclude that Jacob did not ‘outline the facts available to her’ sufficient to ‘make it clear that the challenged statements represent her own interpretation of express facts.'” Jacob’s statements were not clearly attached to an outline of fact and she never explicitly linked her statements to an express factual basis.