Issue
In Los Angeles Unified School District v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, (— Cal.Rptr.3d —, 2007 WL 1548998, Cal.App. 2 Dist., May 30, 2007), a California Court of Appeal considered the legality of a school district’s refusal to provide a neighboring city and its city attorney the records they had requested under the California Public Records Act (“Act”).
The court dismissed the district’s claim that neither the city nor its city attorney was a “person” and therefore not eligible to seek records under the Act, and affirmed a trial court’s ruling that the district must release the records.
Facts
The City of Long Beach (“City”), and its City Attorney, Robert Shannon (“Shannon”), sought records from the Los Angeles Unified School District (“District”) relating to a proposed school construction project that City officials thought may have an impact on traffic, fire, and police services in City neighborhoods. Shannon made a request under the Act to the District to produce various District documents relating to the project’s site selection, construction specifications, and busing studies.
The District declined to produce the records, claiming that the Act specifies that “persons” or “members of the public” have the right to review public records, but that it does not provide the same right to government agencies and their officers. The City petitioned the Superior Court to direct the District to produce the documents. The court directed the District to produce the documents, and the District appealed.
Decision
The only issue before it, the court said, was whether the City and its attorney had standing to request public records from the District. The District relied on the Act’s language in Government Code Section 6252 which defines “members of the public” as “any person, except a member, agent, officer, or employee of a federal, state, or local agency acting within the scope of his or her membership, agency, office, or employment.”
However, the ultimate purpose of the Act, the court noted, “is to encourage full disclosure and openness in governmental affairs.” In deciding whether the City is a “person” for the purposes of the act, it must apply the presumption that the Legislature intends reasonable results consistent with its apparent purpose. Concluding that the City is not a “person” and therefore not permitted to seek public records under the Act, would lead to an absurd result, under which any person could request and receive the records, but not the City or its employees.
The court ruled Shannon is a “person” for the purposes of the law. The District’s contention that the Act’s language, that a government agent is entitled to access to records from that agency, means that government agents are entitled to records only from their own agency, is contradicted by the next sentence of the Act, the court said. Rather, it appears to be a broad grant of authority: “Nothing in this section shall limit the ability of elected members or officers to access public records permitted by the law in the administration of their duties.” Furthermore, the court continued, Shannon would remain free to ask his “mother, father, brother, sister or any John Q public” to obtain the records for him—another absurd result.
The trial court’s order that the District produce the records was affirmed.