Attorney’s Fees Award For § 1983 Claim Can Be Adjusted Downward Where The Plaintiff Obtained Limited Success And The Result Does Not Confer A Meaningful Public Benefit

In McCown v. City of Fontana, (— F.3d —, C.A.9 (Cal.), Dec. 24, 2008), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered the issue of whether a district court erred in awarding attorney’s fees in the amount of $200,000 where the plaintiff settled his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit for use of excessive force by police officers for $20,000. The Court of Appeals held that the district court erred in failing to adequately explain its reason for the $200,000 award and in granting an excessive award in light of the plaintiff’s limited success.

Facts

Ian McCown was in a group of people at a City of Fontana park when officers of the Fontana Police Department came to investigate complaints of drug activity. Officers instructed the group to get down on the ground. An officer approached McCown and told him to put his hands behind his back and then get up on his knees. The officer then grabbed McCown and stood him up. McCown hopped horizontally as the officer stood him up. The officer then told McCown to get down, but McCown took a few steps away from the officer. The officer grabbed McCown’s shirt and forced him to the ground, and then both the officer and McCown rolled downhill. The officer put McCown on his stomach, handcuffed his arms behind his back, and then pulled out a Taser and “tased” McCown. McCown claims that the officer tased him on his stomach and on his genitals, but the officer claims that he only tased McCown on his chest.

McCown filed a lawsuit against the City, the Police Department, and two individual officers (collectively, “City”) alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 including, among other violations, use of excessive force and wrongful arrest. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of City on the wrongful arrest claim. City and McCown reached a settlement on the excessive force claim under which City agreed to pay McCown $20,000. City also agreed that McCown was the prevailing party and that the district court would determine the attorney’s fees due to McCown under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. McCown requested $301,155.22 in attorney’s fees and $15,034.10 in costs. The district court awarded McCown $200,000 in attorney’s fees and $15,034.10 in costs. City appealed from the district court’s decision.

Decision

The Court of Appeals held that the district court erred in setting the attorney’s fee award. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 “a court may award the prevailing party in a § 1983 claim ‘a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.'” The reasonableness of the attorney’s fee award “is determined primarily by reference to the level of success achieved by the plaintiff.” A court awarding such a fee must “provide a concise but clear explanation of its reason for the fee award” and also “make clear that it has considered the relationship between the amount of the fee awarded and the results obtained.”

Here, the district court failed “to adequately explain its reason for the award it granted.” Generally, when determining an attorney’s fee award, a district court will multiply the number of hours spent on the case by a reasonable hourly rate. The resulting number is referred to as the “lodestar” amount.” The district court found that the fees requested by McCown were excessive and that McCown’s counsel did not establish that they were entitled to between $400 and $550 an hour. However, the district court did not explain how it reached the $200,000 figure on which it ultimately settled, and in particular failed to show the hourly rate or the number of hours allowed in the lodestar calculation. Therefore, the Court of Appeals determined that the matter must be remanded to allow the district court “to make the necessary calculations and provide the necessary explanations.”

In addition to making a lodestar determination, a district court must determine the reasonableness of an attorney’s fee award under § 1988 by answering the following two questions: “First, did the plaintiff fail to prevail on claims that were unrelated to the
claims on which he succeeded? Second, did the plaintiff achieve a level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award?”

The district court correctly answered “no” to the first question. Although each of McCown’s claims was based on different legal theories against different defendants, all of his claims arose from a common core of facts arising out of his arrest.

However, the district court erred when it failed to analyze the attorney’s fee award in light of the second question. City asserted that McCown’s attorney’s fee award should be reduced because McCown originally asserted nine claims against City, he only prevailed on one claim, and he received only “a fraction of what he originally requested in his settlement demands.” The court agreed that factors such as those pointed out by City must be examined when making a fee award.

The Court of Appeals held that “attorney’s fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 must be adjusted downward where the plaintiff has obtained limited success on his pleaded claims and the result does not confer a meaningful public benefit.” A district court must, however, “consider the excellence of the overall result, not merely the amount of damages won.”

McCown only received a $20,000 settlement on his one remaining claim after the court granted summary judgment on his other claims in favor of City. He received less than one-tenth of the amount he originally requested in his settlement. On remand, “the district court should take into account McCown’s limited success when determining an award.”

The Court of Appeals rejected McCown’s argument that he achieved an “excellent result.” McCown’s case did not establish a deterrent for police conduct or result in a change in the Police Department’s policies.

The Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the district court so that it could reconsider the issue of attorney’s fees and costs.

Questions

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