U.S. Supreme Court Discusses Los Angeles Ordinance Regulating Adult Entertainment Businesses

The United States Supreme Court, in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 122 S.Ct. 1728 (2002), held that the City of Los Angeles, in passing an ordinance prohibiting the operation of more than one adult entertainment business within the same building, could rely on a 1977 study regarding the effect of concentrations of adult businesses on crime in surrounding communities.

In 1977, City conducted a study that concluded that concentrations of adult businesses are associated with higher rates of prostitution, robbery, assaults, and thefts in surrounding communities. Based on this study, City enacted an ordinance prohibiting the establishment of an adult entertainment business – an adult arcade, bookstore, cabaret, motel, theater, or massage parlor – within 1,000 feet of another such enterprise. The City later expanded the prohibition by prohibiting the establishment or maintenance of more than one adult entertainment business in the same building.

Multi-use establishments, such as those that contain both adult bookstores and adult arcades within the same building, are thus prohibited. Two such businesses challenged the amended ordinance as violating their First Amendment rights to free speech. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgments in favor of the businesses, determining that City failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that its regulation of multi-use establishments is designed to serve its substantial interest in reducing crime. The Supreme Court agreed to listen to City’s appeal of the Ninth Circuit’s decision.

Using the three-step analysis developed in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), the Supreme Court held that City could rely on its 1977 study as evidence to show that its regulation is designed to serve its substantial interest in reducing crime:

  1. Is the ordinance a time, place, and manner regulation? Yes, because it does not ban adult entertainment businesses altogether; it merely restricts their location in the same building.
  2. Is the ordinance content neutral? A regulation is content neutral if it is not aimed at the content of speech, but rather at the secondary effects of the speech on surrounding communities – such as the effects on crime rates, property values, and the quality of neighborhoods. The Ninth Circuit Court did not address this question, because it determined that, even if the ordinance is content neutral, City could not satisfy the third step. Therefore, the Supreme Court also did not specifically address the question of whether the ordinance is content neutral.
  3. Did City show that its ordinance was designed to serve a substantial government interest? Like the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court focused on the quality and applicability of the 1977 study. City was required to rely on evidence that it “reasonably believed to be relevant” to the secondary effect of reducing crime. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the 1977 study focused on the effect that a concentration of establishments – not a concentration of operations within a single establishment – had on crime rates. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that it was reasonable for City to conclude, based on the 1977 study, that “reducing the concentration of adult operations in a neighborhood, whether within separate establishments or in one large establishment, will reduce crime rates.”

The Supreme Court concluded that the businesses should not have received summary judgment because City’s evidence fairly supported its rationale for the ordinance. Therefore, the Court sent the case back to the trial court, where the businesses will have the opportunity to demonstrate that City’s evidence does not support its rationale or to dispute City’s factual findings. If the businesses succeed in casting doubt on City’s rationale, the City will then have to present “evidence renewing support for a theory that justifies its ordinance.”