According to the United States Supreme Court, in a Title VII employment discrimination case, there is no limit on the amount of frontpay damages that a plaintiff can receive. [Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 121 S.Ct. 1946 (2001). ]
Traditionally, plaintiffs filing employment discrimination claims under section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have been entitled to injunctions, reinstatement, backpay, lost benefits, and attorney fees. Beginning in the 1970s, courts began awarding another remedy now known as frontpay. Frontpay has taken two forms: (1) money for compensation lost during the period between judgment and reinstatement, and (2) money in lieu of reinstatement in those cases where reinstatement is not viable because of continuing hostility or psychological injuries suffered by a plaintiff as a result of the discrimination.
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress further expanded the remedies available to employment discrimination plaintiffs to include compensatory and punitive damages. (42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1)). Compensatory damages may include damages for future pecuniary loss, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, and loss of enjoyment of life. The amount of compensatory and punitive damages, however, is limited by § 1981a(b)(3), and the limit is based on the number of people employed by a particular defendant.
Since the passage of § 1981a, employers have argued that frontpay is a compensatory damage because it is for pecuniary loss. Therefore, they argue that frontpay is limited in amount by § 1981a(b)(3). Relying on the express language of section 1981a and its purpose, the United States Supreme Court rejected this argument. First, the Court noted that the remedies authorized in § 1981a were in addition to the remedies already available to employment discrimination plaintiffs. Furthermore, § 1981a(b)(2) states that compensatory damages, as they are referred to in § 1981a, do not include remedies already allowed under § 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Thus, because frontpay was a remedy available to plaintiffs when § 1981a was passed, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress did not limit the amount of frontpay that a plaintiff can receive.