Neither City Nor School District Liable For Injuries To Pedestrians Who Were Struck By An Unlicensed Driver While Walking In A Crosswalk On Their Way To A Nearby School

In Cerna v. City of Oakland, (— Cal Rptr.3d —, 2008 WL 1120599, Cal.App. 1 Dist., Apr. 11, 2008), a California Court of Appeal considered whether a trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of a city and a school district in a lawsuit brought after one child was killed and several other pedestrians were injured when they were struck by an unlicensed driver as they walked in a crosswalk on their way to a nearby school. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the city because the intersection where the accident occurred did not create a dangerous condition and did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the school district because it was not responsible for the students outside school property.

Facts

On January 15, 2002, Maribel Espinoza (“Espinoza”), her three children, and her niece and nephew were struck by an unlicensed driver while crossing the street in a crosswalk at the intersection of International Boulevard and 27th Avenue in Oakland, California. Espinoza’s niece was killed in the accident and Espinoza and the other children were injured.

International Boulevard is a four lane road with a concrete barrier dividing the two lanes in each direction. The crosswalk at issue is marked by white parallel lines in the intersection. When approaching from the east, “PED XING” is painted on the pavement. There are also two yellow traffic signs indicating a pedestrian and school crossing. The crosswalk does not have a traffic light or crossing guard. Espinoza and the children were on their way to the International Community School, which has its only entrance on 29th Avenue. The intersection closest to the school is at International Boulevard and 29th Avenue and that intersection is controlled with a stoplight. Espinoza knew from the first day of school that there was no traffic light or crossing guard at the crossing on 27th Avenue because she used the crosswalk four times each school day between the first day of school and the date of the accident.

The surviving pedestrians and family members of the deceased child brought a lawsuit against the City of Oakland (“City”) for alleged dangerous conditions at the intersection and the Oakland Unified School District (“School District”) for its failure to assure safe school access. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of City and School District.

Decision

The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the trial court. It held that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of City. Government Code section 815, subdivision (a), provides that a public entity is not liable for an injury that arises out of an act or omission of the entity or its employee except as provided by statute. Government Code section 835.2 provides the only statutory basis for imposing liability on public entities as owners of property.

Section 835.2 provides that a public entity is only liable for an injury which was caused by the dangerous condition of its property if the injured party shows that the property was in a dangerous condition, the dangerous condition was the proximate cause of the injury, “the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred,” and either (1) an employee acting within the scope of his or her employment created the dangerous condition, or (2) the public entity knew or should have known about the dangerous condition prior to the injury for a sufficient time to have taken measures to protect against such condition. A dangerous condition is defined under section 835 as “a condition of property that creates a substantial . . . risk of injury when such property . . . is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” A plaintiff’s alleging a dangerous condition “must establish a physical deficiency in the property itself.”

Here, the pedestrians, citing to Vehicle Code 21368, alleged that the intersection was dangerous because, among other things, it was painted white, not yellow and there was no sign painted on the roadway on the approach with the words “SLOW—SCHOOL XING.” The court held that Vehicle Code section 21368’s mandatory provisions regarding yellow paint and roadway signage did not apply here because the intersection was not contiguous to school grounds. The intersection was approximately 50 feet from the periphery of undeveloped school property. The only entrance to the school was three blocks away from the intersection where the accident occurred. The lack of a traffic signal and/or crossing guard also did not prove that a dangerous condition existed. The court concluded, as a matter of law, that the intersection where the accident occurred did not create a dangerous condition.

The court also concluded that the trial court did not err in concluding as a matter of law that School District was not responsible for the safety of the students in this situation. Education Code section 44808 provides that a school district is not “liable for the conduct or safety of any pupil of the public schools at any time when such pupil is not on school property, unless such district, board, or person has undertaken to provide transportation for such pupil to and from the school premises, has undertaken a school-sponsored activity off the premises of such school, has otherwise specifically assumed such responsibility or liability or has failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.” The pedestrians urged that the “reasonable care” language in section 44808 subjects school districts to liability whenever a district fails to exercise reasonable care.

The court rejected this argument finding section 44808 does not create general negligence liability. Pursuant to section 44808, “school districts are not responsible for the safety of students outside school property absent a specific undertaking by the school district and direct supervision by a district employee.” The court found that the “reasonable care” language in section 44808 does not create an independent basis for liability.

The court further found that School District did not specifically assume responsibility for the pedestrians’ safety. It rejected the pedestrians’ argument that it assumed responsibility when it prepared an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act which analyzed traffic safety impacts. Nothing included in the EIR suggested that the School District assumed any responsibility for the safety of pedestrians at the intersection at issue.

The School District also did not assume responsibility for the pedestrians’ safety when it adopted a resolution which found that the site selection standards for the International Community School were met. Those standards included a standard for pedestrian safety. School District informed of it’s compliance with the “School Area Pedestrian Safety” manual. However, this manual, the court noted, does not create mandatory duties but instead provides only advisory guidelines.

Finally, pedestrians failed to show that alleged statements from an unknown School District representative to parents that the School District would make it safe for students to walk to and from school amounted to an assumption of responsibility for pedestrian safety by the School District. The pedestrians alleged that an unidentified School District representative told parents that the School District would install traffic lights or stop signs, or hire traffic guards. The court concluded that representations allegedly made by school representatives were too vague to constitute a specific assumption of liability by the School District. Also, the court noted that the lack of a traffic guard was not a proximate cause of the pedestrians’ injuries.