Issue
The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, recently addressed the issue of whether a city was required to meet and confer with a police officers association regarding a new program that required police officers to keep records regarding racial profiling. (Claremont Police Officers Association v. City of Claremont, (cite))
Facts
Initially, the Police Department of the City of Claremont (City) implemented a program that required police officers to orally record with the dispatcher the race, age, and gender of drivers and pedestrians stopped by police officers if the stop did not result in an arrest or citation. After determining that this information was insufficient to determine whether officers were engaging in racial profiling, the police commission approved a new policy that required police officers to complete a written form asking for additional information, such as an officer’s perception of the driver’s race or ethnicity before the stop, the initial reason for the stop and any resulting search, the duration and outcome of the stop, and the location of the infraction. The Claremont Police Officers Association (Association) asked to meet and confer with City about the policy; City denied the request. The Association then filed a lawsuit to compel City to meet and confer.
Appellate Court Decision
The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (Act) requires public agencies to “meet and confer in good faith” with representatives of employee organizations “regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” (Gov. Code § 3505) This duty to meet and confer does not apply to matters regarding “the merits, necessity, or organization of any service or activity provided by law or executive order. (Gov. Code § 3504) In other words, the duty to meet and confer does not apply to “‘more general managerial policy decisions’ over which a public employer retains discretion to act unilaterally.”
Considering these two provisions, the Court of Appeal analyzed whether the new racial profiling recording program affected the terms and conditions of the police officers’ employment. The Court first noted that the initial decision to undertake measures to guard against racial profiling met the definition of Section 3504 because it was a fundamental policy that directly affected the service provided by the police department. However, the decision of how to implement the fundamental policy “involves several variables affecting law enforcement officers and is not itself a fundamental policy decision.” Furthermore, the commission’s decision of how to implement the policy affects the police officers’ working conditions for several reasons. Because racial profiling is illegal, an officer accused of racial profiling based on information gleaned from the new program could face disciplinary action, denial of promotion, or other adverse action. The information obtained under the program could potentially be publicly disseminated or misused as City intended to use outside research teams to analyze the data. Finally, the new policy differed significantly from the old policy, particularly because it required a written report, used outside research teams, and required the reporting of more data items.
Because the new vehicle stop policy significantly affects working conditions and is not a fundamental policy decision, the Court of Appeal determined that City was required to meet and confer with Association before implementing the policy. The Court therefore sent the case back to the trial court with directions to order City to revoke its decision to implement the new policy and to meet and confer with Association before making another decision on the matter.
Legal Alert Email Disclaimer
Legal Alerts are published by Kronick Moskovitz Tiedemann & Girard as a timely reporting service to alert clients and other friends of recent changes in case law, opinions or codes. This alert does not represent the legal opinion of the firm or any member of the firm on the issues described, and the information contained in this publication should not be construed as legal advice. Should further analysis or explanation of the subject matter be required, please contact the attorney with whom you normally consult.