In Sun v. City of Oakland, (— Cal.Rptr.3d —, 2008 WL 4194001, Cal.App. 1 Dist., September 15, 2008), a California Court of Appeal considered whether a city could be held liable for the death of a person who was struck by an automobile while crossing a street in an unmarked crosswalk. The court found the crosswalk was not a dangerous condition that contributed to the death, that the death was in fact caused by a reckless driver, and ruled the city could not be held liable for it.
Facts
Rong Zeng Peng (“Peng”) was struck and killed by an automobile while walking across an unmarked crosswalk on International Boulevard in Oakland (“City”) in 2004. A driver in the left lane of the road had seen Peng a block away and stopped to allow her to cross. A car driven by Ramon Jackson (“Jackson”) then swerved to the right of that car and through the intersection, striking and killing Peng.
Peng’s husband, Song X. Sun (“Sun”), sued the City claiming it created a dangerous condition when it repaved the intersection but did not repaint the crosswalk markings, and when it constructed “bulb out” extensions of the sidewalk into the intersection. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City and Sun appealed.
Decision
Reviewing the language of Government Code Section 835, the court noted that a public entity is generally liable for injuries caused by the dangerous condition of its property if: the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury; the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury that occurred; and, either a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the entity created the dangerous condition; or the public entity had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition in time to prevent the injury.
Here, the court said, there was simply no evidence that because the City had not repainted its crosswalk, and had constructed the bulb out extensions, were factors in the death. The court explained that although the City violated Vehicle Code Section 21950.5, which requires public notification and input before crosswalk markings are removed, no evidence suggested that this error contributed to the death. Further, while it is true that Jackson’s negligent driving would not absolve the City of liability for a dangerous condition, the court said, the Sun failed to offer evidence that Jackson’s negligence stemmed from a dangerous condition.
Quoting Chowdbury v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1187, “A four-way stop is not an inherently dangerous condition when used with due care by the general public. The only risk of harm was from a motorist who failed to exercise due care by obeying the de facto stop signs. The city was not liable for that conduct.” Similarly, the City was not liable for Jackson’s negligence here, the court found.
Finally, the court rejected the assertion that the failure to repaint the crosswalk created a “hidden trap,” that “would not be reasonably apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by, a person exercising due care,” again quoting Chowdbury. The first driver saw Peng and stopped, evidence that the intersection was not unsafe, the court noted.
The trial court’s ruling in favor of the City was affirmed.